Miami Marlins Worked Themselves Into Corner With
Third Base Situation

post from Fish Stripes - All Posts on 07 December 2012 10:01:52 AM. © Fish Stripes - All Posts

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The Miami Marlins seemed to have their third base problem resolved for 2013 when they acquired Yunel Escobar from the Toronto Blue Jays. Unfortunately, it seems Escobar had a "change of heart" and did not want to move to third base, and the Marlins subsequently traded him to the Tampa Bay Rays for Derek Dietrich.

The problem with this move is that it leaves the Fish in the same place they were at the end of the 2012 season: without a third baseman and with few remaining options available. We discussed a few of the options available to the team yesterday, and none are attractive in the least.

The Marlins have not had a decent regular third baseman since Miguel Cabrera was traded all those seasons ago. Since then, Jorge Cantu spent the most time on the team at third base, and he was followed by a litany of plug-ins and replacement-level scrubs. The team's inability to find a medium-term solution at the position has plagued long before this offseason leading into 2013.

Remember that this was supposed to be fully resolved by Hanley Ramirez, who was under contract through 2014. Presumably, the Marlins would have had their third base solution for three seasons before having to make yet another decision on the position after years of difficulty. But the team seemingly gave up not only on Ramirez, but on the entire 2012 core extremely early into their existence. In the case of Ramirez, it was understandable that the Marlins thought he would not bounce back from his more recent struggles. At the same time, as we later saw, it seems the trades of midseason were just a prelude to a full-on fire sale to be completed in the offseason, which means that it is very likely the Marlins gave up on the 2012 core in just half a season of play. It shows an extreme lack of foresight and planning to abort a mission so early on its maiden voyage.

It looks especially ridiculous when the team's lone developed prospect at third base, Matt Dominguez, was one of two players traded for the most minor of midseason upgrades at first base, Carlos Lee. At the time of the trade, I felt the Marlins were giving up too much for a player who was mostly retaining name value. The good news was that the organization was set at third base for a change and therefore did not need Dominguez, whether he was or was not ready for the big leagues. Three weeks later, the Marlins traded Ramirez as well, once again showing a distinct lack of foresight.

Leading up to this impasse in 2013, the Marlins traded away both the medium- and potentially long-term solutions at the position and headed into a weak 2013 free agent class without an answer at third base. With the team's barren farm system, it also seemed extremely difficult to find an answer in the trade market without giving up their major league talent. Marlins fans were left wondering whether Donovan Solano or Emilio Bonifacio were going to be the solutions at third base, or whether the team would simply start an overmatched Greg Dobbs. But following the Hanley Ramirez trade, there was at least indication that the Marlins would look to spend money in 2013 and beyond in order to improve the ball club. Of course, now that seems like a pipe dream, and as a result the whole plan at third base has looked ragged and disheveled.

I have been harping on the team's lack of a coherent plan going forward from year to year. The lack of stability within the Marlins organization starts with the revolving door of managers and continues into the direction of the team as a whole. It trickles down right to the management of certain positions on the team, such as third base. The team's latest setback was not necessarily their fault, as Escobar has known character issues and certainly is understandable in his desire not to switch to an inferior defensive position in order to play for a last place team. But one gets the feeling that, with a long-term plan for success and the patience to stick to that plan, the Marlins would not run into the sort of problems they currently face at third base. If the Marlins were simply patient and careful with their planning, maybe they would already have options of their own at this position rather than scraping the bottom of the barrel for third basemen yet another season.

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Rumor: Yankees and Mets talked R.A. Dickey trade,
no fit

post from Bronx Baseball Daily on 07 December 2012 10:01:06 AM. © Bronx Baseball Daily

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ade-no-fit/

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Johnny Benchs First MVP Season 1970!

post from 30-Year Old Cardboard on 07 December 2012 10:00:14 AM. © 30-Year Old Cardboard

Johnny Bench’s First MVP Season – 1970! It would be very hard to argue if Johnny Bench was a better offensive player or defensive player. This is a true testament to his amazing all-around game. Bench’s skill level far exceeded … Continue reading →

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Center fielders of attention

post from Philliesflow.com on 07 December 2012 09:43:40 AM. © Philliesflow.com

John Mayberry, Shane Victorino and Ben Revere have all gotten at least 296 plate appearances in each of the lastRead the Rest...

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Rumor: Yankees checking on Josh Hamilton

post from Bronx Baseball Daily on 07 December 2012 09:29:32 AM. © Bronx Baseball Daily

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An alternative method for determining defensive
WAR

post from Beyond the Box Score - All Posts on 07 December 2012 09:02:17 AM. © Beyond the Box Score - All Posts

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According to FanGraphs, Darwin Barney was an excellent defensive player in 2012. Barney, the everyday second baseman for the Chicago Cubs, was worth about 13 runs, or 1.3 wins above replacement, due to his defensive contributions at the pivot. This is a very good number.

According to Baseball-Reference, Darwin Barney was the most excellent defensive player in baseball in 2012, along with Brendan Ryan. In terms of wins above replacement, B-R had Barney at about three-and-a-half defensive WAR. This is a tremendous amount of value ascribed to a single player -- especially one who does not play shortstop. It can mean the difference between a good starter and an All-Star level of performance.

These two comparisons of value are just a bit different.

This is a symptom of a greater problem in sabermetric circles these days: can we trust single-season WAR values, when the defensive component of WAR is, let's just say "debatable"? For a while now, there's been a lot of discussion about how useful the defensive metrics that go into WAR are, especially on a year-by-year basis.

The most common refrain I hear is that the sample sizes used to judge a fielder's performance in a given year are simply too small to ascribe much real weight to these numbers. Nevertheless, a good (or bad) defensive season can mean a gigantic swing in wins above replacement. While the WAR metrics aren't used as catch-alls by everybody, when a player has a dramatic swing in perceived defensive value, it can show up in plenty of articles and analyses about how much value a player is worth, and how useful their performance has been / can be.

Perhaps what we need to do is *deep breath* rely less on the UZR / DRS / TZ / FRAA numbers, and more on a scouting perspective.

I can just see some of my Beyond the Box Score colleagues shaking their heads and writing me off. Next thing you know I'll be advocating for Jack Morris in the Hall of Fame.

But hear me out. There's a very real issue with the way the saber community is providing a numerical value to a player's fielding contribution, and converting it into hypothetical runs (and wins). This isn't meant to be a dig at the phenomenal work that Michael Lichtman has done with UZR, or that Baseball Info Solutions has done with DRS, or any other fielding metric. We'd still be worse off if we were going by fielding percentage.

But nevertheless, there's a very real ~~need~~ #want to create a runs / wins metric for fielding performance, as we attempt to numerically identify the whole of a player's contributions. So what's the solution?

What if we were to find a reputable scout, or team of scouts, or group of people that can function almost like a team of scouts, and develop a baseline expectation for a player's defensive performance during a season? Then we might be able to use this as a balance against the vagaries of single-season defensive statistical noise.

I'll give you an example.

David Wright is an interesting third baseman. I'm not a pro scout, but when I look at David, I see a third baseman who winds up being about average, defensively, at his position. This is due to a combination of good instincts, good range, okay hands, and a questionable throwing arm. Again, if you put a gun to my head (don't, please), I would say that he's probably average at his position, maybe just a hair below-average. But in 2012, he looked a little better than usual.

Advanced stats seem to tell a different story -- well, in practice, at least. UZR has pegged Wright as a bad defender over the period of 2009-2011. But it was consistent, as David was worth just about -10 runs defensively to his team. in 2012, David was worth a positive 15 runs defensively. That's a two-and-a-half-win swing between 2011 and 2012, and a very different perception than the previous year. DRS saw something very similar: a combined -34 defensive runs saved from '09 to '11, but 16 runs in the black for 2012.

Now, I believe that there is a chance that David Wright's baseline defensive value changed dramatically from 2011 to 2012. Maybe Wright refocused his energy on taking grounders, or he bought a new mitt, or his back felt better, or his offensive outburst helped his confidence and that showed on defense. But I also believe that the small samples, both in 2012 and in previous seasons, didn't actually give us an accurate mathematical representation of his true defensive value to the team (not to mention his elusive "true talent level.")

I don't think that David Wright was a god-awful defender in 2011. And I'm not sure he was a transcendent defender in 2012. But I'm also not a scout, and I didn't watch every Mets game last season, and it might not have mattered if I did. But I think that it's equally likely that a respected scouting opinion, or something worthwhile like a robust Fans' Scouting Report, might be able to give us a good view, at least from a scouting perspective, as to how good of a fielder a player is.

And I think that maybe we should use this to help build a new defensive WAR with the advanced metrics.

Here's my hypothetical: say that Joe Respected Scout (or Fans' Scouting Report) gives Wright a set of scores similar to what's in the Fans' Scouting Report now -- something we can boil down to a run value. Might it be a good idea to take this number and create an average (or some sort of weighted average) between this and the raw UZR or DRS number?

I like to think of this not about "less stats" or "less precision" and more like regression. If smart, savvy talent evaluators think that David Wright is a scratch defender at third, but the data produces blips from year to year, maybe the data isn't right. Maybe when determining the player's overall value, even for a season, we need to examine something beyond these (really cool) advanced fielding statistics.

In truth, I'm not a savvy enough number-cruncher to come up with a statistically-sound way to do this on my own. But for now, I'm going to try and use this back-of-the-envelope methodology as a personal tool when evaluating a player's seasonal performance. Maybe it will be a complete disaster, as the opinions I seek are going to be too slanted, too out-of-date, or just too wrong. Maybe there's a better way to do this.

But what I've had to do before now, even as I learn more and more about how range factors and Good Fielding Plays and all the other things that go into "advanced defensive stats," is ignore that defensive number when thinking about WAR, because it either didn't pass a smell test, or the sample size made it an flawed assessment tool.

Sometimes the numbers tell us too little about a player's performance, even when they're meant to tell us everything. Let's see if we can get closer.

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http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2012/12/7/3735408/alternative-method-defensive-w
ar-wins-above-replacement-dwar-fwar-rwar-warp

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Johnny Bench & The 1968 Rookie Of The Year Award

post from 30-Year Old Cardboard on 07 December 2012 08:30:41 AM. © 30-Year Old Cardboard

Johnny Bench & The 1968 Rookie Of The Year Award Johnny Bench appeared in 24 games as a 19-year old catcher in 1967. And it didn’t take long for him to make an immediate impact with his team. Just 1 … Continue reading →

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Happy Birthday Johnny Bench!!!

Happy Birthday Johnny Bench!!! Johnny Bench turns 66 years old today. Regarded as the greatest catcher in the history of the game, I will give Mr. Bench the only thing that I can: 1 day of posts on this blog … Continue reading →

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Yankees are looking to hire an assistant hitting
coach

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December 7, 2012

December 7, 1937 - The Boston Red Sox acquire the contract of 19-year-old leftfielder Ted Williams,[...]

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